Introduction
Many criticize international organizations (IOs) for their apparent lack of accountability to both member states and local people in the countries where they operate. They apply such criticisms to a wide variety of IO activities, including monetary policy (Vreeland 2006) , peacekeeping operations (Lipson 2010) , and development programs (Gutner 2002) . IOs are often too far removed from democratic processes to face effective pressure from local people who are affected by their actions. Member states require a broad, and therefore difficult to obtain, consensus to reform or terminate IOs (Dahl 1999 , Nye 2001 . These challenges raise fundamental concerns about the roles IOs play in international affairs (da Conceição-Heldt 2013, Delreux and Kerremans 2010 , Elsig 2007 , Frey and Stutzer 2006 , Haftel and Thompson 2006 , Lake 2007 ).
The lack of democratic feedback at IOs has led to the establishment of specific institutions that aim to make IOs more accountable for achieving their mandates. A subset of these institutions, which I refer to as accountability mechanisms, seek to enhance oversight of IOs by investigating and processing monitoring from civil society groups. Accountability mechanisms include audit procedures, accountability panels, citizen complaint boards, and ombudsmen offices (Grigorescu 2010) . Each of these institutions manages a process that can lead states to sanction an IO if it acts outside of its policies or mandates.
Little evidence exists about when and why accountability mechanisms contribute to accountability from IOs -the condition when states can credibly identify, sanction, and deter actions by IOs that fall outside of policies and mandates. I argue that these mechanisms result in greater accountability from IOs when monitoring by civil society groups combines with oversight by powerful member states. Monitoring is more likely when civil society groups are organized around the relevant issue and can provide information without fear of retribution.
When powerful states find the actions flagged by civil society groups undesirable and have institutional means to sanction IOs, they are likely to hold IOs accountable for their actions. I show that the Inspection Panel has changed lending to recipient countries where monitoring by civil society groups and sanctioning by donor countries is jointly available. Civil society groups are more likely to file complaints when they are organized around environmental issues and when they can challenge government without fear of repression. I address the non-random generation of complaints using a matching procedure before analyzing how complaints affect the allocation of projects. I find that countries are less likely to receive environmentally risky projects after Inspection Panel cases if they borrow exclusively from the arm of the World Bank that faces greater oversight from donor states through a regular replenishment process. These findings suggest that civil society groups and states can combine advantages in monitoring and sanctioning to promote accountability from IOs.
Can Accountability Mechanisms Enhance Oversight at IOs?
The management and staff of IOs do not always act in ways that member states prefer (Barnett and Finnemore 1999 , Gutner 2005 , Nielson and Tierney 2003 , Pollack 1997 . Management often seeks to preserve organizational autonomy, resists undergoing costly reforms, or prioritizes different outcomes than member states because of 4 professional socialization , Weaver 2008 . Individual staff might use resources for private gain or seek to secure career advancement because of the incentives set by management (Wapenhans 1992) . When member states cannot easily monitor the operations of IOs, the divergent preferences of IO management and staff become problematic.
In many cases, it is impossible for states to observe all the operational actions of IOs, which limits oversight and accountability (Ascher 1983 :422, Hawkins and Jacoby 2006 , Lyne et al. 2006 , Woods and Narlikar 2001 . Uncertainty can limit oversight by states when the outcomes of actions are not realized until long after decisions are made (Barnett and Finnemore 1999 , Lipson 2010 , Lyne, et al. 2006 . The worst consequences of divergent preferences and limited monitoring are easy to observe. For example, in 2005 news broke that the United Nations office established to monitor the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq had not ensured that revenues were spent on humanitarian programs. This resulted in billions of dollars overpaid or lost (Miller 2005) . At the multilateral development banks, project teams have not always protected local people from environmental harm, despite clear directives from member states (Gutner 2002 , Gutner 2005 , Nielson and Tierney 2003 .
While states often have trouble monitoring IOs, civil society groups often cannot sanction IOs for poor performance. When governments run afoul of their interests, civil society groups can seek accountability through electoral processes or revolutionary means. Civil society groups that seek redress for the actions of IOs must gain support from powerful states (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Woods and Narlikar 2001) . Even direct publicity campaigns that civil society groups pursue against IOs typically aim to induce member states to intervene (Park 2005:103-06) . Finding sympathetic states can be impossible, especially when the offending actions by IOs fall below the level of state attention (Smythe and Smith 2006) . This problem is compounded for civil society groups in poor countries, which may lack the resources to access international decision-making forums and advocacy networks (Acuña and Tuozzo 2000 , Keck and Sikkink 1998 , Kravchenko 2010 . Making matters more difficult, civil society groups have few legal remedies against IOs (Bradlow 2004) .
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These challenges have prompted concerns that IOs can act without accounting for local interests, even when member states would like to protect local interests. Grant and Keohane (2005:41) argue, for example, that "sanctions remain the weak point in global accountability since they can only be implemented by the powerful -for example, by powerful states over multilateral organizations." Civil society groups must rely on "peer" and "public reputational" forms of accountability and use informational strategies to highlight how IOs fail to live up to the mandates set by member states. Success for civil society groups depends on deploying information in ways that disrupt IO-state relations, which is often difficult (Keck and Sikkink 1998 , Park 2005 , Park 2005 ).
In many cases, powerful states have preferences to increase the legitimacy of IOs by making them responsive to the concerns of local people (Bowles and Kormos 1999 , Hurd 1999 , Pallas and Urpelainen 2012 , Princen and Finger 1994 , Woods and Narlikar 2001 . For IOs with development mandates, donor countries have expressed a strong preference that local people not be harmed by displacement, corruption, or environmental deterioration in the programs they fund (Shihata 2000) . Yet these outcomes can be difficult for states to monitor. Effective oversight of IOs for accountability, like other public agencies, depends on both monitoring and sanctioning. Accountability mechanisms might combine the advantages civil society groups have in monitoring with advantages that states have in sanctioning to ensure that errant actions by IOs are corrected and deterred.
The Rise of Accountability Mechanisms at IOs
By establishing accountability mechanisms, member states create conditions for the joint availability of monitoring and sanctioning. Accountability mechanisms have two core elements.
First, dispersed and independent monitors can submit complaints about IO actions, thereby reducing the costs and increasing the volume of information available to member states.
Second, an investigative body processes this information and reports to member states about whether the IO violated mandates or policies (Table 1) . oversight prompted by alarms occurs as often as theoretical accounts would predict (Balla 7 2013) . Legislatures that oversee bureaucracies do not always respond to citizen monitoring, which may affect the propensity of citizen groups to provide monitoring (Epstein and O'Halloran 1995) . This creates complex strategic interactions between legislatures, bureaucracies, and civil society groups, making the outcomes and efficacy of "fire-alarm oversight" unclear in many circumstances (Lupia and McCubbins 1994) .
Accountability mechanisms at IOs remove some of this complexity, since they are institutional pre-commitments to investigate complaints by civil society groups. While research on responses to citizen complaints about domestic bureaucracies focuses on the alignment of interests between legislators and monitors (e.g., Parker and Dull 2013) , accountability mechanisms at IOs pre-screen complaints based on the interests of member states and create independent processes to investigate and resolve complaints. This arrangement is closer to domestic legal recourse, but is available to claimants at lower costs.
Accountability mechanisms at IOs might contain important lessons about how institutional pre-commitment to citizen complaints can promote accountability from public organizations. Internationally, recent research explores the importance of oversight in determining the performance of IOs (Elsig 2010 , Gutner and Thompson 2010 , Johns 2007 , Reinalda and Verbeek 2004 . The degree to which IOs can be controlled has important implications for the roles they can and should hold in international affairs ).
When and Why Do Accountability Mechanisms Constrain IO Actions?
Accountability mechanisms cannot work without monitoring. Civil society groups frequently monitor the actions of IOs related to trade, development policy, and macroeconomic management (Almeida 2007 , Dai 2007 , Lake and McCubbins 2006 , Nelson 1996 , Raustiala 1997 , Roberts 2008 However, the existence of civil society groups in a particular domain does not mean that these groups can produce information that is useful for oversight. Civil society groups have a superior ability to monitor policies and programs that directly impact identifiable and small groups of people (Keck and Sikkink 1998:27 Additionally, civil society groups that face high risks from sharing information should be less likely to provide monitoring. Policy advocacy depends on freedom of association and space for collective action (Longhofer and Schofer 2010) . IOs and their members states may not want their failures exposed and may seek to squelch claims of poor performance (Clark 2003) .
Under threat of political repression, civil society groups may not provide monitoring, choosing instead less confrontational approaches to dealing with IOs.
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To enhance oversight and promote accountability, states must be able and willing to 
Test Case: Claims for Environmental Performance at the World Bank
The specific conditions that contribute to the joint availability of monitoring by civil society groups and sanctioning by member states will vary by accountability mechanism.
However, the World Bank Inspection Panel offers a unique opportunity to test theoretical expectations about the effect of jointly available monitoring and sanctioning. In this case, civil society groups are not uniformly able to provide monitoring across recipient countries and donor countries have varying levels of influence over different lending arms of the World Bank, particularly those that do and do not require regular replenishments.
The World Bank has a controversial history of exposing local people to the toxic byproducts of industrial development, displacing rural communities through large hydropower projects, and allowing large swaths of natural landscapes to convert because of uncontrolled settlement after road building, among other harms (Gutner 2002 , Rich 1994 . Under pressure from domestic NGOs, donor countries and especially the U.S. have sought to limit "disaster projects." By moving away from approving highly risky projects in response to monitoring, donor countries are better able to maintain public support for appropriations to the World Bank, which is in turn necessary to maintain the voting share that allows donor countries to steer policy on international development (Wade 2002 ).
In the early 1990s, the U.S. and other donor states pushed the World Bank to establish policies to protect local people from the negative consequences of development projects. These policies require environmental impact assessments during the planning of projects and compensation for displacement or the loss of access to natural resources (World Bank 1993) .
Despite the adoption of these policies, donor states are not in a position to monitor implementation across thousands of field sites. Civil society groups might fill this gap in some countries.
A Brief Introduction to the Inspection Panel
By the late-1980s, opposition from civil society groups to environmentally risky World
Bank projects grew strident. The Narmada Dam in India, which was approved for financing by the World Bank in 1985, became a focal point for this opposition. When it became clear that tens of thousands of people would lose their homes as a result of the project, and that vast areas of forest and agricultural land would be inundated, both Indian and international civil society groups mobilized in protest. Hundreds of thousands of people marched against the project and participated in civil disobedience in project areas (Clark 2003) . These protests were supported by international NGOs, leading to legislative hearings in donor countries about the environmental and social practices of the World Bank (Authorizing Contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF 1993).
In response to protests and pressure from donor countries, the World Bank agreed to form an independent commission to review the Narmada project. The commission found systematic flaws in the planning, design, and implementation of the project, mostly regarding environmental management and resettlement (Morse and Berger 1992 In particular, U.S.-based NGOs demanded a permanent commission that would review complaints by civil society groups about the environmental and social performance of the World Bank, a position that the U.S. adopted after sustained lobbying (Mallaby 2004 
Provision of Inspection Panel Requests at the World Bank
Since violations of environmental policies are the most common item in Inspection requests, countries with more environmental NGOs should produce more Inspection requests.
Countries with more environmental NGOs already have organizational capacity and have overcome collective action problems related to environmental monitoring and advocacy (Rydin and Pennington 2000) . Since requests for Inspection do not require broad support from the public, the number of environmental NGOs can be understood as an absolute measure of the ability of civil society groups to engage in environmental monitoring. The number of environmental NGOs captures several theoretical concepts related to monitoring ability, including the amount of foreign resources available for environmental advocacy, the collective action potential of society, and the degree of environmental concern among the public.
Hypothesis 1: Borrowing countries with more environmental NGOs experience more
Inspection requests related to environmental problems.
In addition, more Inspection requests should originate in countries that protect political rights, since civil society groups do not threaten their existence by engaging in monitoring.
Inspection Panel investigations often delay the disbursement of lending projects, which may harm the borrowing countries and lead to repression (Clark 2003:15-17 
Provision of World Bank Inspection Requests
From 1994-2009, civil society groups filed 61 Inspection requests (Technical Appendix, Table 8 ). Of the 41 requests that included an environmental complaint, the Board approved 25 full investigations, which produced 22 cases that required remedial actions related to environmental policies. Since I seek to first explain the provision of monitoring through the Inspection Panel, I create a panel that includes every country-year when a borrowing country is eligible for an Inspection request, which is up to two years prior to having at least one active project or any year when at least one project is active. 6 The outcome of interest is a binary variable that is positive for any country-year when a civil-society group files an Inspection request regarding World Bank environmental policies. Recognizing the problems associated with over-specified models (Achen 2005) , I choose the minimum number of predictor variables that capture the theory proposed above, together with other omnibus variables that are likely to explain broad variance in the provision of Inspection requests. Civil society groups may also respond to internal evaluations. For example, Marra (2000) finds that civil society groups highlighted World Bank evaluations on corruption in Tanzania and Uganda as part of their advocacy activities. Thus, I include the variable EVALUATION W/ SAFEGUARD FAILURE IN PAST 5 YRS., which is positive whenever a project evaluation completed by the independent evaluation department in the previous five years noted a failure to implement environmental policies. Finally, it is possible that effective governments are more likely to avoid Inspection requests because their capacity to implement policies is higher.
Evidence suggests that good governance is associated with better implementation of environmental laws and policies (Weidner 2002 
Model Results
The results confirm that organization by civil society groups around environmental issues and an absence of political repression are important predictors of Inspection requests involving environmental issues (Table 2) To aid substantive interpretation, Figure 1a shows the predicted probability of 
Influence of Inspection Cases on Environmentally Risky Lending
The most direct way to test whether Inspection cases alter future lending decisions is to examine the impact of these cases on the approval of projects that tend to give rise to Inspection projects received a category "A" risk rating and required full environmental impact assessments and management plans. The combined value of these projects is approximately $58 billion, which represents 16% of total World Bank lending during the time period. In the models presented below, I use projects assigned a category "A" risk rating to construct the dependent variable. I consider the factors that make a borrowing country more likely to receive at least one category "A" project in a given year.
Factors Contributing to the Approval of Risky Projects
To test whether Inspection cases decrease the rate of approval for category "A" projects, I create two primary predictor variables. REQUEST PREVIOUS 3 YRS. is a binary variable that indicates an Inspection request involving environmental performance was made during the previous three years, regardless of whether the request was approved for a full investigation (H3a). Since some requests prior to 1999 were not approved for investigation due to disagreements on the Board (Clark 2003:15-17) , it is important to recognize the possibility that all Inspection requests offer a signal. INVESTIGATION PREVIOUS 3 YRS. is a binary variable that indicates a full investigation was approved by the Board of the World Bank during the 25 previous three years (H3b). Since the Board either actively or passively agreed to have the Inspection Panel collect more information about these cases, they may be a stronger signal.
It is challenging to estimate the effect of Inspection cases on the subsequent approval of environmentally risky projects because several variables that predict Inspection requests (as reported in the models above) are also likely to influence lending directly. A regression model that assumes independence between the Inspection cases and the control variables risks confounded estimates of the effect of Inspection cases on lending.
Thus, it is necessary to isolate a group of control observations that are similar in observable ways to country-years affected by requests. To address this issue, I adopt a prematching process proposed by Ho and colleagues (2007) . The goal of this approach is to prune and re-weight the dataset so that treated observations (i.e., country-years with Inspection requests in the past three years) are observationally equivalent to control observations with regards to other observed variables, or more formally:
where ρ is the observed probability, X is a matrix of control variables, and T is the treatment state. I additionally match on a lagged measure of the dependent variable (number of risky projects in the previous three years), which should balance unobserved factors that make some countries more likely to receive risky projects.
I include all of the variables that consistently predict the provision of Inspection requests, as reported above, in the matching procedure to ensure that they are balanced across treatment conditions. The number of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) predicts the provision of Inspection requests, but it also might have a direct effect on the allocation of environmentally risky projects through the expectations of staff about the opposition they are likely to face in approving and implementing a project. Likewise, political rights are associated with Inspection requests, but might also have a direct effect on environmentally risky lending. Repressive borrowing countries might be more likely to insist on projects, even if they face substantial opposition from the public, or World Bank staff might avoid projects in countries where they know they will face public opposition.
Since previous research has shown that multilateral development banks respond to performance information contained in evaluations (Buntaine 2011) Borrowing countries that receive more risky projects in the previous three years (No.
RISKY PREVIOUS 3 YRS.) have a revealed preference for environmentally risky borrowing and might continue to borrow for risky projects at a higher rate than other countries despite increased oversight associated with Inspection cases. This lagged dependent variable should control for recipient preferences for environmentally risky projects over time. Additionally, since the choice to pursue at least one risky project is likely to be a function of overall lending amounts, I also match on the total lending of any kind that each recipient received in the previous three years (LENDING PREVIOUS 3 YRS.) .
To distinguish countries that are subject to greater oversight from donor states, I split the original panel of country-years into two groups. The groups distinguish country-years when the borrowing country did or did not have access to IBRD-only loans in the previous three years. Borrowing countries that have access to IBRD-only lending are better able to shift risky lending to that window to avoid oversight from donor states, have access to sovereign lending on commercial markets, and are considerably more likely to fully design their own projects.
IBRD lending may be less influenced by donor preferences because it does not require frequent replenishments from donor countries.
I first pre-prune the dataset so that the treatment and control observations have common support based on a convex hall test, which discards observations that are outside the range of values of the independent variables in the other group (King and Zeng 2007) . I then use a genetic algorithm to search across candidate datasets where each treatment observation is matched to one or more control observations that are similar on the variables used for matching (Diamond and Grieve 2008) . Intuitively, the matching algorithm discards "control" observations (i.e., those that do not have an Inspection case in the previous three years) that are dissimilar to the "treatment" observations (see Technical Appendix for technical exposition).
In the post-matching dataset, the treatment state (an Inspection case in the previous three years) is no longer correlated with observable variables used for matching, which decreases the potential that the estimated effect of Inspection cases is confounded by other variables. The post-matching data set is constructed solely by balancing the treatment and control groups by maximizing the smallest p-value of the paired t-test between the treatment and control groups for any single covariate, rather than parametric modeling assumptions. After pruning the dataset so that control observations are observationally equivalent to the country-years with Inspection requests and investigations, I find significant support that the Inspection Panel has caused the World Bank to be more selective about environmentally risky projects in countries that require IDA support for all of their projects and cannot shift their 29 borrowing to the arm of the World Bank that faces less oversight from donor countries (Models 2b & 3b). In contrast, Inspection requests do not appear to influence lending decisions about environmentally-risky projects for countries that are able to fund at least some projects entirely from the IBRD lending arm. This result provides preliminary evidence that the effect of Inspection cases is not primarily driven by the preferences of recipient countries for less environmentally risky lending after cases, since the effect of Inspection cases should be constant across World Bank lending arms under that scenario.
These results confirm the hypothesis that external monitoring can have an important impact on IO behavior when it enhances oversight by member states, which in this case varies across the IDA and IBRD lending arms. As seen in the 90% treatment effect confidence interval at the bottom of Figure 2 , an Inspection case decreases the probability of receiving at least one environmentally risky project by more than 50% for countries that require IDA lending. These results are robust to regression without matching, matching that includes the number of ENGOs, and matching that uses proportions or counts of risky projects in each country-year as the dependent variable (see Technical Appendix). For example, as an institution, the Inspection Panel offers a pre-commitment to potential monitors that states will consider certain types of complaints. This pre-commitment lowers uncertainty for monitors, making it more likely that they will provide costly monitoring. This arrangement reflects domestic legal institutions, but has lower entry costs based on flexible filing requirements. This kind of institution -where complaints are screened, but a response is pre-committed -might be used more broadly to incentivize monitoring in complex strategic contexts (see Lupia and McCubbins 1994) .
At the World Bank, the primary limitation of civil society monitoring is that it is not provided uniformly across all countries. This means that citizens in borrowing countries that repress political rights are not as likely to avail themselves of the Inspection Panel when their interests are harmed. Inspection requests are less frequent in countries that do not have civil society groups mobilized around environmental issues.
The uneven availability of monitors raises an important concern about the promise of accountability mechanisms at IOs: they are not easily available to the people who lack alternative pathways to accountability. Civil society groups that operate in countries with strong political and civil rights can use accountability mechanisms at IOs more easily. They can also pressure their own government directly or form relationships with international advocacy groups (Fox and Brown 1998) . Thus, the Inspection Panel augments the options available to groups that already have other political options in their home countries. It does not provide for uniform responsiveness to the concerns of local people in borrowing countries.
As such, monitoring by civil society groups does not provide a substitute for systematic monitoring and evaluation carried out by states, internal departments at IOs, or external auditing bodies. Other procedures that provide for monitoring and sanctioning should not be overlooked. Available procedures include administrative policies that restrict agent discretion, specialized monitoring and evaluation offices, and periodic strategic planning.
Existing research on principal-agent relationships in international relations has mainly explored the negative consequences of delegation. However, principals are not powerless in managing IOs after delegation. Oftentimes, civil society groups can play an important role in enhancing oversight and improving accountability. Future research on the performance of IOs, which is attracting increased attention, will need to focus on mechanisms that harness the advantages of civil society groups in monitoring to enhance oversight by states (see Gutner and Thompson 2010) . Civil society groups can play an important role in promoting accountability in global governance.
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